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THE BIOSIMILAR PATENT DANCE – IF YOU DON’T 
DANCE, YOU’RE NO FRIEND OF MINE 
By Alexej Ladonnikov1 
In response to political pressure, Congress has been seeking 
solutions to control drug prices and make it easier for consumers to 
afford pharmaceuticals. The legislative response to this concern was 
the Biosimilar, Price, Competition, and Innovation ACT (“BCPIA”). 
This act allows the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to 
accelerate the approval pathway for biosimilar drugs that effectively 
act as generic drugs (“generics”). This note analyzes how courts have 
handled the following three outstanding issues with the BCPIA: (1) 
whether compliance with the BCPIA is required or optional; (2) 
whether an applicant needs to wait until after the FDA approves a drug 
to notify the creator of the patented product of their intent to market 
the biologic; and (3) whether the applicant needs to participate in the 
entire process.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the financial collapse of 2008, American consumer 
budgets have been increasingly squeezed.2 This led to increased 
political pressure to rein in drug prices.3 In 2009, Congress enacted the 
BPCIA in an effort to control drug prices.4 The BPCIA provided an 
accelerated FDA approval pathway for “biosimilars,” which are 
biologics with similar pharmacological features to ones already on the 
market. Those features are similar enough that biosimilars effectively 
act as generics.5 Biologics are a class of large molecules, usually 
derived via recombinant DNA techniques in specialized tissues 
cultures, producing drugs as complex as monoclonal antibodies and 
immunoglobins.6  
Biologics are one of the fastest growing segments of the 
pharmaceutical industry, with the top 10 products accounting for $73 
billion in global sales as of 2017.7 Unfortunately, intellectual property 
rights relating to biosimilars, when marketed as generics, are too 
complex to effectively regulate under the pre-BPCIA framework 
                                                          
2Household Expenditures and Income, Pew Charitable Trusts (Mar 2016),  
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/03/household_expenditures_and_income.pdf.   
3 Shamane Mills, States Try To Rein In Prescription Drug Prices, WPR (April 27, 2017, 3:15pm), 
https://www.wpr.org/states-try-rein-prescription-drug-prices.  
4 42 U.S.C. § 262.   
5 Generic Drugs: Questions & Answers, FDA INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS (DRUGS) (Jan. 04 
2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm. 
6 How do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION,  
https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ.  
7 Kathlyn Stone, Top 10 Biologic Drugs in the United States, THE BALANCE (Oct. 12, 2017),  
 https://www.thebalance.com/top-biologic-drugs-2663233.   
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established by the Hatch-Waxman Act.8 The BPCIA established such 
a framework for handling patent infringement disputes by a mechanism 
that has come to be known as “the patent dance.”9 This dance involves 
several rounds of information exchange and negotiation to clearly 
delineate any infringement claims, and is meant to cut down on the time 
and expense of discovery and litigation.10 
This article outlines the current jurisprudence on some of the 
major unresolved issues relating to the BPCIA. This article first 
summarizes the salient elements of the BPCIA and the patent dance, 
then addresses three major issues that the courts are currently reviewing 
or have recently reviewed. First, this article assesses whether 
compliance with the BPCIA patent dance is a required or an optional 
procedure. This issue will determine how much “bite” the BPCIA 
legislation has on parties that wish to use the abbreviated approval 
pathway, but spurn open exchanges of information, and consequently 
impact how many millions of dollars worth of litigation will play out. 
Second, and in conjunction with the first issue, the question arises of 
whether an applicant must wait until after FDA approval to notify a 
reference product sponsor (“RPS”), the creator of the patented product, 
of their intent to market their product. The answer will dictate whether 
patent holders (“innovators”) will be given an extra 180 days of patent 
exclusivity on top of their existing 12 years. Lastly, this article looks at 
whether innovators or generic manufacturers must engage with the 
entire sequence of steps, or may engage more selectively, thereby 
influencing expensive litigation while still gaining some benefit from 
the legislation. Each of these three issues are raised in current and 
pending court actions at varying levels. The analysis of this article is 
informed by the discussion of these issues in such court cases alongside 
the legislative history of the BPCIA. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. What are Biosimilars and why is the BPCIA needed? 
In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act (informally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act) was enacted.11 
Hatch-Waxman encouraged more companies to make use of the 
                                                          
8 Dennis Crouch, BPCIA: Patent Dance Steps Becoming a Bit Clearer, PATENTLYO (Aug. 16, 
2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/08/patent-becoming-clearer.html.  
9 Id. 
10 Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 775 (2010). 
11 21 U.S.C. § 355. 
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Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for generic drugs.12 
While generic drug manufacturers were already allowed to use this 
approval “fast-lane,” Hatch-Waxman gave innovators and generic 
manufacturers protections and incentives designed to get generics to 
market sooner while also protecting innovators.13 This lead to a boom 
in the generic drug industry, which helped drive drug prices down over 
time.14  
Up until the 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry was working 
overwhelmingly on “small molecule” drugs.15 Drugs of this type are 
created by chemists going through discrete chemical addition steps to 
form the structure of the final molecule.16 Since then, the advent and 
refinement of recombinant DNA technology has opened up an entirely 
new type of product – large molecule drugs, also known as biologics 
or biopharmaceuticals. These “large molecules” offer orders of 
magnitude more complexity and clinical applications. The BPCIA 
defines a biologic as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, 
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, 
protein (except any chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous 
product . . . .”17 
For the purposes of this article, the focus will be on therapeutic 
proteins. Humira is an excellent example of a therapeutic protein, as it 
illustrates the structural and manufacturing complexity of biologics, as 
well as both their economic and medical value. It is the leading 
treatment for rheumatoid arthritis and has garnered 16 billion dollars in 
sales as of 2016.18 In context of technical complexity, the active 
molecule in Humira has a molecular weight of 144,190.3 g/mol, while 
                                                          
12 Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and 
Generic Drug Competition, FINNEGAN: CURRENT TOPICS IN MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY (2010), 
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-hatch-waxman-act-encouraging-innovation-and-
generic-drug.html.  
13 Donald Chisum, Chisum on Patents 161 (Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2017). 
14 Ralph A. Lewis, The Emerging Effects of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, 8 J. CONTEMP HEALTH L. & POL’Y 361, 361-78 (1992); Luke M. Olson 
& Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic Drug Competition on Generic Drug Prices During 
the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day Exclusivity Period, FTC BUREAU OF ECONOMICS (Apr. 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/estimating-effect-entry-generic-drug-
prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/wp317.pdf. 
15 Orphan Drugs Lead 2015 Approvals, BIOTECHPRIMER (Jan. 7 2016), 
https://weekly.biotechprimer.com/orphan-drugs-drive-fda-approval-record-for-2015/.  
16 How do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORGANIZATION,  
https://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ. 
17 42 U.S.C § 262(i)(1). 
18 Alex Philippidis, The Top 15 Best-Selling Drugs of 2016, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECH 
NEWS (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.genengnews.com/the-lists/the-top-15-best-selling-drugs-of-
2016/77900868.  
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another recent blockbuster drug named Sovaldi (which treats Hepatitis 
C) has a molecular weight of 529.5 g/mol, which is typical of small 
molecules.19 This 1000 factor difference is salient because it 
underscores the critical value of manufacturing techniques for large 
molecule drugs.20 A talented chemist can look at a small molecule 
compound and work backwards from the structure to form a synthesis 
pathway of discrete steps that is different from that of the innovator’s 
steps.21 In contrast, large molecules can only be assembled by 
biological processes by living cells, usually by genetically engineering 
bacteria and optimizing their environment in highly selective ways.22 
Recombinant DNA technology has been used to engineer various kinds 
of specialized tissues to produce the required drugs en masse.23 This 
results in a situation where a generic manufacturer is far more likely to 
infringe on an innovator’s patented manufacturing techniques when 
producing a biologic than a small molecule.   
Because of how much more complicated both structures and 
production techniques are in biologics, the regulatory mechanisms 
meant to stimulate generic manufacturing under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act are inadequate.24 The cost of developing a biologic is currently 
estimated to be $2.5 billion (doubling in the last ten years alone) 25, 
whereas generic manufacture is estimated to only cost $100-250 
million.26 This cost differential results in both parties willing to engage 
in costly and exceptionally time consuming patent suits, resulting in 
drugs getting to market far more slowly than they otherwise would. 
Thus, it became necessary to pass legislation aimed specifically at the 
increased complexity found in biologics, resulting in the BPCIA.  
                                                          
19 See Christopher A.Lipinski, Lead- and drug-like compounds: the rule-of-five revolution, 1 
DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY: TECHNOLOGIES,  337-341 (2004). 
20 Small Molecule Versus Biological Drugs, GENETICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Jun. 29, 
2012), http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/Research/Small-molecule-versus-biological-
drugs. 
21 See generally Brown et. al, Organic Chemistry (4th ed. 2005). 
22 Thomas Morrow & Linda Hull Felcone, Defining the Difference: What Makes Biologics 
Unique, NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (Sep. 4, 2004), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3564302/.  
23 Id. 
24 Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act - 25 Years Later: Keeping the Pharmaceutical 
Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/genericsupplement0809/generic-
hatchwaxman-0809.  
25 Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5B, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-develop-new-
pharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b/.  
26 Erwin Blackstone & Joseph Fuhr Jr., The Economics of Biosimilars, NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (Sep. 2013), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4031732/.  
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B. BPCIA—abbreviated approval pathway 
Much like the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA offers an 
abbreviated approval pathway for biologics that are meant to act as 
cheaper replacements for biologics already on the market. For small 
molecules, generic products contain the identical chemical element as 
the drug innovator’s product. In biologics, the active element must be 
relatively similar to the original product but does not have to have 
identical physical properties. The BPCIA categorizes biologics into 
two classes: biosimilar and interchangeable.27  
To receive biosimilar status, a manufacturer must prove that the 
compound in question is “highly similar to the reference product 
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components . . 
.”28 and that there is “no clinically meaningful differences between the 
biological product and the reference product in terms of the safety, 
purity, and potency of the product.”29 To achieve this, data must be 
derived from analytical studies of the material itself as well as clinical 
studies, which include immunogenicity, pharmacokinetics, and 
pharmacodynamics.30 These clinical studies must sufficiently show 
“safety, purity, and potency in 1 or more appropriate conditions of use 
for which the reference product is licensed and intended to be used and 
for which licensure is sought for the biological product . . . .”31 
Essentially, a generic manufacturer must prove chemical and clinical 
similarity so as to show no meaningful difference when compared to 
the reference material. Additionally, the mechanism of action must be 
the same if that mechanism is known, the route and dosage must be the 
same, and the production facilities must meet safety standards.32  
Once these requirements have been met, a drug is given biosimilar 
status. This means that it may be marketed as an equivalent treatment 
as the reference product, but a patient’s health care provider must take 
action to switch a patient onto the newly marketed generic.33 This leads 
to the second tier of similarity, codified in the BPCIA as 
“interchangeable.”34  Once a drug has satisfied the requirements to be 
interchangeable with its reference product, it may be switched with the 
                                                          
27 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
31 DONALD O. BEERS & KURT R. KARST, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA 
APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 21-1 (8th ed. 2017) 
32 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(III); 42 U.S.C. § 
262(k)(2)(A)(i)(IV); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(V). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3). 
34 Id. 
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reference product without any action by the prescribing health care 
provider, making it more akin to a small molecule generic.35 
To be given interchangeable status, a product must first satisfy all 
of the biosimilarity requirements outlined above.36 After this, an 
applicant must show that if a “product that is administered more than 
once to an individual, the risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy 
of alternating or switching between use of the biological product and 
the reference product is not greater than the risk of using the reference 
product.”37 Essentially, the risks associated with switching from 
original to generic must be no greater than the risks of the original drug 
alone. This criterion is critical for drugs that require long term 
administration as opposed to single dose drugs used to treat acute 
conditions.  
C. The Patent Dance 
The BPCIA laid out a mechanism by which the RPS and 
biosimilar applicants could resolve patent disputes. This mechanism, 
dubbed the “patent dance,” consists of a series of steps between the 
RPS, which is the party that owns the drug being used as a reference 
material for a biosimilar, and the abbreviated Biologic License 
Application (“aBLA”) applicant going through several rounds of 
information exchange. This dance is aimed at narrowing the scope of 
the eventual patent litigation, preemptively cutting down on costly and 
time consuming discovery and helping deliver drugs to patients more 
quickly and at a lower cost.38   
The patent dance involves two stages, the first having seven major 
steps: 
Stage 1: 
1. Applicant files aBLA with FDA, creating an “artificial” 
infringement.  
2. Within 20 days of the FDA accepting their drug for review, 
a new drug applicant notifies the RPS of their plans to 
release a biosimilar, confidentially discloses their FDA 
application for the drug, and confidentially discloses their 
manufacturing information. 
3. Within 60 days of (1), RPS then identifies patents it could 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(B). 
38 Joanna Brougher, The Biosimilars Act: Promoting or Discouraging the Development of Generic 
Biologics?, NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3008392/.  
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reasonably assert against the applicant (based on 
applicant’s disclosures), as well as RPS’ own willingness 
to license those patents.  
4. Within 60 days of (2), applicant responds with explanations 
of why their product does not infringe upon identified 
patents, why RPS’ claims are invalid, or why they are 
unenforceable.  Alternatively, applicant may state that it 
will not begin commercial marketing until the listed 
patents expire. 
5. Within 60 days of (3), RPS provides a rebuttal to 
applicant’s claims of non-infringement, invalidity, or 
unenforceability. After applicant’s receipt of the rebuttal, 
the parties have a period of 15 days to negotiate in good 
faith as to which patents should be the subject of an 
infringement suit. 
6. If the parties agree on which patents to litigate over, RPS 
files suit over those patents within 30 days of the 
agreement. But if parties fail to agree within 15 days of 
starting negotiations, then they simultaneously exchange 
a list of patents that each party believes should be the 
subject of the infringement suit.  
a. After negotiations fail but before the actual 
exchange of lists of patents, the applicant has to 
inform RPS of the number of patents it intends to 
list. RPS’s list of patents cannot exceed this 
number, unless applicant lists no patents, in 
which case RPS may list one.  
7. If the parties simultaneously exchange lists, then RPS has 
30 days to file infringement claims on each of the patents 
on the exchanged lists. Applicant then notifies FDA of the 
suit within 30 days of service and provides a copy of the 
complaint.  
Stage 2: 
1. Applicant provides RPS a notice of commercial marketing 
(“NCM”) no later than 180 days before the date it seeks 
to market their biosimilar.39 
II. ANALYSIS 
Unsurprisingly, a contingent of biotech companies have taken 
each other to court over their respective engagements with the process 
outlined above. The following analysis looks first at outstanding issues 
                                                          
39 42 U.S.C. § 262(l). 
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that still need resolution, and second, at issues that have been resolved 
without addressing  secondary problems.  
The first major issue, recently decided by the Supreme Court, is 
whether parties are obligated to engage with the patent dance at all.40 
Dependent on this initial engagement issue, is the additional issue of 
whether an applicant can send its NCM to the RPS prior to FDA 
approval.41 Finally, the issue of whether parties have to engage in the 
patent dance to its completion or may engage in selective steps is 
addressed. 42 
A. Amgen v. Sandoz – is the patent dance required, and when 
are NCMs filed? 
Of the numerous legal strategies that have arisen since the passage 
of the BPCIA, one of the most adventurous has been the idea that the 
patent dance is merely one legal avenue that a party may pursue, but is 
not required. This strategy has been put into play by several companies, 
spurring varied judicial responses. Of this group, Amgen Inc. v Sandoz 
Inc. has made its way to final judgment at the Supreme Court of the 
United States, with the decision being rendered in June 2017.43   
1. Background 
Amgen has been on the forefront of BPCIA litigation on a variety 
of issues, but some of the most pivotal decisions have come from 
Amgen’s dispute with Sandoz over Sandoz’s proposed usage of the 
BPCIA to gain streamlined FDA approval for a generic version of 
Amgen’s Filgrastim.44 This widely profitable drug is used to treat 
chemotherapy side effects and has been on the market since 1991.45 In 
October 2014, Amgen filed a complaint, alleging that Sandoz had filed 
an aBLA with the FDA to take advantage of the shorter approval 
pathway, but had refused to provide Amgen with a copy.46 
Additionally, the complaint stated that Sandoz had sent Amgen an 
NCM prior to FDA approval of the application.47 Amgen sought 
injunctive relief to force Sandoz to comply with the parameters of the 
                                                          
40 Complaint at 2, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. et al, No. 14-CV-04741 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2015). 
41 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1667-8 (2017). 
42 Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion Healthcare Co., 239 F. Supp. 3d 328, 332 (2017). 
43 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668-9 (2017). 
44 Filgrastim, Tbo-filgrastim, DRUGS (Nov. 11, 2016), 
https://www.drugs.com/monograph/filgrastim-tbo-filgrastim.html.  
45 Id. 
46 Complaint at 2, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. et al, No. 14-CV-04741 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2015). 
47 Id. 
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BPCIA.48 Amgen initially filed suit and lost in the Northern District of 
California, then appealed the ruling in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which made its way to the Supreme 
Court shortly thereafter.  
2.  Issues 
The issues raised by Amgen’s complaint are two-fold. The first 
issue is that by refusing to provide Amgen with a copy of the aBLA 
sent to the FDA, Sandoz was refusing to engage in the patent dance, 
and it was Amgen’s position that such engagement was mandatory and 
could be enforced via injunctive relief.49 The second issue was whether 
an NCM could be issued prior to FDA approval of an application, as 
this would cut short the otherwise required 180-day continued 
exclusivity period that a patent holder keeps between generic approval 
and first commercial marketing.50 
3.  Supreme Court Decision 
The Court held that federal injunctive relief was unavailable as a 
means of enforcing the patent dance, but remanded the case back to the 
circuit court to determine if state injunctive relief is a valid 
alternative.51 Furthermore, the Court held that an applicant did not have 
to wait for FDA approval to send an RPS the required NCM.52  
a. aBLA Disclosure 
21 U.S.C. §262(l)(2)(A) states that an applicant “shall provide to 
the reference product sponsor a copy of the application submitted to 
the Secretary under subsection (k) . . . .”53 The circuit court held that 
the list of remedies available for artificial infringement found in 
§271(e)(4) (which does not contain injunctive relief) was the 
exhaustive list.54 While this lead to the correct conclusion, the Supreme 
Court found  this to be the incorrect reasoning. It explained §271(e)(4) 
only applies to artificial infringement, and that the positive act of 
handing over the aBLA was what created that artificial infringement. 
                                                          
48 Id. at 23. 
49 Id. at 2. 
50 Id. at 23. 
51 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668-9 (2017). 
52 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1680 (2017). 
53 21 U.S.C. §262(l)(2)(A). 
54 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1352 (2015).  
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The failure to give the aBLA meant no artificial infringement occurred, 
making §271(e)(4) inapplicable.55 
 The Court also held that aBLA handover is not enforceable by 
federal injunction because of the text found in §262(l)(9)(C), which 
states that if an applicant fails to provide the aBLA to the RPS, then the 
RPS has a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. §2201 for declaration of 
infringement, validity, or enforceability for the patents involved in the 
biologic or its manufacture.56 What this means is that an RPS can file 
a declaratory judgment action against an applicant for artificial 
infringement. This gives the RPS control over the scope and timing of 
litigation that the applicant would otherwise possess, but more 
importantly, it deprives the applicant of the power to be sure of its legal 
rights prior to marketing. Consequently, this position puts the applicant 
at risk of spending money on moving forward with commercial 
marketing ventures without the assurance that such marketing will be 
found legal in later litigation.  
The Court continued to explain that the lack of any other textually 
specified remedy for failure to hand over the aBLA indicates that 
Congress intended this remedy to be the only federally available one, 
to the exclusion of federal injunctive relief.57 Despite this, Amgen’s 
original causes of actions included both BPCIA claims and state 
claims, such as unfair competition under California Business & 
Professions Code § 17200.58 The case was remanded to the circuit court 
to decide whether Sandoz conduct was unlawful under state law, and 
whether such state law remedies are pre-empted by the BPCIA.59  Upon 
review, the circuit court found that any injunctive relief provided by 
state law would exhibit both field and conflict preemption by the 
careful framework of the BPCIA erected by Congress.60 
b. aBLA Disclosure Analysis 
The final result of the Supreme Court’s decision poses a choice to 
biosimilars applicants: engage in the patent dance, or cede some control 
of when and what patents are litigated to the RPS. For now, this will 
result in a cost benefit analysis for manufacturers, which will be driven 
largely by business decisions.  
                                                          
55 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1668-9 (2017). 
56 Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C). 
57 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1677 (2017). 
58 Complaint at 2-3, Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. et al, No. 14-CV-04741 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2015). 
59 Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1682 (2017). 
60 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326 (2017). 
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It is worth noting an important difference in the questions that 
Amgen posed at the trial level and the answers that the Supreme Court 
supplied. Amgen’s disclosure claim was functionally comprised by two 
questions: (1) is aBLA disclosure “required,” and (2) is injunctive relief 
available for violation of that requirement? Yet, the Court’s response 
was to the question “is injunctive relief available for violations of the 
required aBLA disclosure?” The Court deftly avoided answering the 
direct question of whether aBLA disclosure is “required” in the sense 
that it is unlawful to refuse to do so, or whether it is simply a “condition 
precedent.”61 The Court stated: “[w]e decline to resolve this particular 
dispute definitively because it does not present a question of federal 
law.”62 It continued on to explain that a federal court’s job in this 
situation was to determine whether the aBLA had been supplied to the 
RPS, and if not, to allow the RPS to file a declaratory judgment action, 
per §262(l)(9)(C).63 A ruling on whether the aBLA disclosure is 
mandatory or conditional would only matter in the context of 
designating it as “unlawful” conduct for the purposes of other laws 
where specifically “unlawful” conduct is penalized.64 (One such 
example is California Business & Professions Code § 17200.)  
The Court then remanded the case to the circuit court to 
specifically decide if California law would treat noncompliance with 
the requirement as “unlawful,” which would potentially open the door 
to state law remedies.65 Despite this, the circuit court’s opinion in the 
remanded case also manages to artfully avoid answering the direct 
question of whether noncompliance is “unlawful.” Instead, the circuit 
court goes directly to the question of whether federal law in this arena 
pre-empts any state law, which the court affirms.66 By deciding that no 
possible state remedy would be applicable due to preemption, the 
circuit court avoided having to answer the Supreme Court’s question 
of the “unlawful” nature of the behavior for purposes of state law.  
This result is yet another parallel with the Hatch-Waxman 
provisions: a company harmed by another company’s actions under 
Hatch-Waxman cannot obtain a court order for compliance. Despite 
closing the door, the Court left the proverbial window open: in a 
footnote, the Court commented that it’s holding “express[ed] no view 
on whether a district court could take into account an applicant’s 
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66 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1326-28 (2017). 
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violation of §262(l)(2)(A) (or any other BPCIA procedural 
requirement) in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction . . . 
against marketing the biosimilars.”67 It appears that the Court left open 
the possibility that a district court could consider a company’s violation 
of aBLA disclosure as a factor in deciding to give injunctive relief 
during a patent infringement trial.68 Given the quality and quantity of 
BPCIA litigation that has occurred, it is likely that this point will come 
up in future cases.  
In addition to the existing legal wrangling over BPCIA 
requirements, one notable provision has thus far not been given a great 
deal of attention. §252(f) states that any person that violates the 
provisions of the section can be fined or imprisoned up to one year.69 
This leaves open the possibility of federal criminal charges for 
violations of BPCIA, as well as giving the FDA a lever upon which to 
rely if it decides to compel companies to comply with the statute.   
c. NCM prior to FDA Approval 
§262(l)(8)(A) states that an aBLA applicant will “provide notice 
to the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date 
of the first commercial marketing of the biological product is licensed. 
. . .”70 While the circuit court interpreted this language to mean that the 
applicant had to receive FDA licensure prior to NCM issuance, the 
Supreme Court disagreed.71 
The Court applied a grammatical analysis to the text, holding that 
“‘biological product licensed under subsection (k)’ modifies 
‘commercial marketing’ rather than ‘notice,’ ‘commercial marketing’ 
is the point in time by which the biosimilar must be ‘licensed.’”72 This 
gives the applicant full freedom on whether to submit the NCM before 
or after FDA approval. The Court disagreed with the circuit court’s 
ruling that the provision implied two separate time requirements for 
provision of the NCM – after FDA approval and at least 180 days 
before commercial sale.73 “Had Congress intended to impose two 
timing requirements in §262(l)(8)(A), ‘it presumably would have done 
so expressly as it did in the immediately following’ subparagraph.”74 
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d. NCM Analysis 
While Supreme Court’s ruling on the NCM issue was based 
largely on grammatical analysis, the conclusion was well supported by 
arguments concerning Congressional intent. Specifically, whether 
NCM issuance was required to occur at least 180 days after FDA 
licensure. It is understood that FDA licensure will only occur after the 
end of a patent holder’s exclusivity period. If the Court had decided in 
Amgen’s favor, this would have resulted in exclusivity periods 
effectively becoming 12.5 years instead of 12 years. Such a change in 
policy is not something specifically intended by Congress, and thus 
supports the position that Congress did not plan for the statute to be 
interpreted as such. 75 
e. Can companies engage in the patent 
dance only part-way? 
While Amgen v. Sandoz addressed refusal to follow the BPCIA 
litigation pathway, other companies have attempted to hedge their bets 
by engaging in the patent dance, but only to the degree maximally 
advantageous to them. This has been the strategy adopted in numerous 
cases, resulting in similarly legion quantities of litigation. 
Unfortunately, none of these cases have been granted certiorari by the 
Supreme Court, so we have only district and appellate opinions upon 
which to rely. The two cases outlined below are instructive as to both 
current litigation strategies and judicial responses.  
B. Janssen v. Celltrion 
1. Background  
In 2015, Janssen Biotech Inc. filed suit against Celltrion Inc. for, 
amongst other things, failure to disclose manufacturing information.76 
Celltrion handed over its aBLA application to Janssen as specified by 
the BPCIA, but failed to hand over the manufacturing information that 
is also specified in the BPCIA.77 While the parties moved forward part 
way through the information exchange process, Janssen repeatedly 
requested the manufacturing information, and was rebuffed each 
time.78 Celltrion also acquiesced to Janssen’s first round list of patents 
to litigate, and refused to continue any further in the patent dance on 
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the theory that acquiescence to the list renders the remaining steps 
moot.79 
Celltrion also claimed that Janssen was required to file suit within 
30 days of receiving Celltrion’s acquiescence to litigate over the 
patents sent to them in the first round of the patent dance, with failure 
to do so resulting in only reasonable royalties as an available remedy.80 
Celltrion’s position relied on 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6), which states that 
infringement damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(l)(4) and (5)(B) are 
limited to reasonable royalty if the suit is filed more than 30 days after 
the patent dance.81 Janssen’s position was that the 30-day filing 
requirement only applied to patents that were a result of a full patent 
dance, and that failure to follow the required steps meant that the 30-
day requirement was not applicable, meaning Janssen could seek lost 
profits. 82 
It appears that Celltrion’s strategy was to set the tempo of 
litigation by not handing over manufacturing patents related to the 
aBLA, thereby limiting Janssen’s “menu” of patents upon which it 
could dispute. When Janssen picked out a set of relevant product 
patents for the first round of information exchange, Celltrion simply 
acquiesced to Janssen’s chosen patents. Because Janssen believed it 
had to pick patents that it had information on, and because the 
manufacturing information was withheld, Celltrion adroitly limited 
Janssen’s ability to sue for the full suite of appropriate patents (or so it 
thought).  
2. District Court Decision 
Judge Wolf of the Massachusetts District Court favored Janssen’s 
position on the issue of lost profits versus reasonable royalties being 
available. When discussing the reasonable royalty limitation of 
infringement cases resulting from a full patent dance, the court stated 
that “[i]t is only the patents that emerge from this negotiation and, if 
necessary, dispute resolution procedure that are subject to a reasonable 
royalty damages limitation if the patentee does not sue within 30 days 
of the end of this process.”83 Essentially, the court held that the 
reasonable royalty limitation only applied to patents that were an end 
product of the full patent dance.  
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The court continued on to discuss the word “shall” as used in 
§262(l)(4) and (5), which states that parties “shall engage in good faith 
negotiations . . .” and concluded that the language indicated a statutory 
requirement of following the steps in order to receive the benefit of 
limiting damages to reasonable royalties. 84 
3. Analysis 
This ruling was interesting in its contrast to Amgen v. Sandoz in 
the different amount of “bite” the court construes the BPCIA as having. 
While Amgen’s holding gave an RPS a relatively limited amount of 
leverage by giving it the power to set the tempo of litigation, this ruling 
gives an RPS a more specific and sharp ability to pursue far more 
damages in cases of non-compliance. This ruling appears to punish 
non-compliance more concretely. 
C.   Amgen v. Hospira  
1. Background 
In a parallel litigation to Janssen v Celltrion, Amgen filed suit in 
2015 against Hospira Inc., claiming that Hospira had failed to provide 
adequate manufacturing information in conjunction with its aBLA 
disclosure to Amgen.85 It should be noted that Hospira’s response was 
that the required information was part of its aBLA disclosure.86 The 
parties continued on with the patent dance, resulting in an infringement 
suit for a set of patents connected to drug production methods. Amgen 
went on to assert that Hospira’s refusal to hand over information in 
connection with a cell culture medium used in their production process 
prevented Amgen from “assess[ing] the reasonableness of asserting 
claims for infringement” during the required rounds of information 
exchange.87 Amgen sought discovery to remedy the situation, as 
contemplated and allowed in the Supreme Court reviewed decision of 
Amgen v. Sandoz.88 The district court found that Hospira had to 
produce the required information only insofar as it was relevant to the 
existing claims of infringement, and not on the much broader basis of 
BPCIA requirements not tied to specific claims.89 Based on this 
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analysis, the district court ruled against Amgen, stating that the sought 
information was not relevant to the claimed infringements. 90 
2. Circuit Court Decisions 
Unsurprisingly, Amgen appealed this ruling.91 In a decision 
handed down after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Amgen v. Sandoz, the 
circuit court looked to five possible avenues that Amgen could pursue 
to compel disclosure of process information related to §262(l)(2)(A).92 
(1) Injunctive relief as a matter of federal law to enforce 
compliance with the mandates set out in the BPCIA.93 
(2) Injunctive relief as a matter of state law.94 
(3) Filing suit for patent infringement on the basis of failure 
to comply with the disclosures of §262(l)(2)(A).95  
(4) Filing suit on patents actually described in §262(l)(3), 
which are the ones that the RPS believes could reasonably 
be asserted in the post-patent dance litigation.96 
(5) Filing suit on a patent that could be identified under 
§262(l)(3).97 
Per Amgen v. Sandoz, option (1) was explicitly shut down.98 
Option (2) was also shut down several months later when, on remand, 
the circuit court found no state remedies available for violations of the 
BPCIA due to pre-emption.99 Option (3) was also non-viable because 
Amgen held that a failure to disclose information was not an act of 
artificial infringement, therefore allowing for no cause of action in that 
regard.100 As to options (4) and (5), Amgen did not list patents 
connected to cell culture mediums in its information exchanges, nor did 
it bring suit on those patents as ones that “could be identified” under 
§262(l)(3)(A).101  
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Amgen eschewed the above options in favor of a more novel 
approach. It filed suit for infringement on the patents positively 
established by the patent dance, then filed motions for discovery of 
information in connection with the cell culture medium that Hospira 
refused to provide manufacturing information for. 102 
In its opinion, the court looked to Amgen v. Sandoz to inform its 
analysis. Starting with the baseline that discovery is ruled by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that discovery for the 
requested information would be inappropriate because it was not 
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”103 The composition of the 
cell culture media was not connected to infringement on the patents 
specified in the complaint, nor any defenses raised by Hospira. Amgen 
argued that withholding such information during the patent dance gives 
an applicant unilateral power to decide which patents would be litigated 
by preventing the RPS from identifying ones related to the product that 
the RPS believes could reasonably be asserted. This is exactly the 
situation outlined in Janssen v. Celltrion above. 
The court was not persuaded, pointing out that the BPCIA 
penalizes applicants who refuse to exchange information by removing 
the applicant's power to file suit for declaratory judgment, which was 
one of the central holdings of Amgen v. Sandoz. Moreover, the court 
underscored the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 requirement 
of filing claims that “will likely have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”104 On 
this basis, “if a sponsor forms a belief based on an inquiry limited by 
an applicant's withholding of information, the sponsor has still satisfied 
Rule 11.”105 The result was that Amgen should have filed all 
complaints it believed might reasonably be borne out by discovery, 
instead of limiting its complaints and then using discovery to give 
grounds for amending the complaints. 
3. Analysis 
The result of this holding, if upheld, is deeply uncertain. On one 
hand, it correctly punishes actors that benefit themselves by using the 
BPCIA’s abbreviated approval pathway but refuse to abide by its 
litigation curtailing patent dance.  
On the other hand, overly zealous RPS actors may see this ruling 
as a carte blanche to engage in the full patent dance, and then 
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subsequently file suit for additional patents on the grounds of some 
modicum of belief that discovery will yield new ones worth litigating. 
Applicants may fear this exact result, driving them further away from 
a willingness to engage in the patent dance at all, ultimately demeaning 
its purpose of reducing litigation times to get affordable drugs to 
patients more quickly.  
IV OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS 
The results of Amgen v. Sandoz and cases citing it may be 
instructive in the coming years of biosimilar related litigation. Now that 
the Court has established that the patent dance is optional, applicants 
are given the power to choose between sharing all required 
information, or giving the RPS power to file for declaratory judgments 
or standard patent infringement suits. This leads to less certainty for 
RPS actors since they will never know what option an applicant will 
take ahead of time, putting the onus of litigation preparedness on 
innovators. Furthermore, the BPCIA was meant to curtail endless 
patent infringement litigation. By de-clawing the BPCIA of federal 
injunctive relief as an option and allowing patent infringement 
litigation as a viable alternative, this purpose is at least partially 
thwarted. The Act itself was the result of 4 years of negotiation, and 
while maxims of statutory construction cannot be ignored, it seems that 
the result here upsets an already delicate balance of interests. 106 
Moreover, the attitude of “add it to the complaint and hope you 
can get discovery on it” is contrary to the spirit of the BPCIA, since 
this runs against the purpose of creating more transparency to reduce 
litigious gamesmanship. Minimizing one party’s information harms its 
ability to prepare accordingly and act as a maximally informed rational 
actor, unnecessarily generating more risk and cost.  
CONCLUSION 
On the whole, the gamesmanship on display in the above outlined 
cases ultimately harm the consumer. The BPCIA was designed to 
reduce the time and cost of litigation, ensuring generic biologics reach 
market as quickly as possible while protecting patent holder rights, 
consequently balancing the profit motive of innovators and the 
downward pressure on costs for consumers. Instead of abiding by the 
rules, both sides have taken advantage of arguably unclear statutory 
drafting. This has hurt consumers in both cost and time: the colossal 
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legal fees associated with major litigation will no doubt be passed to 
consumers, and injunctions set by courts with pending cases have 
slowed the release of generics. 
 While drug prices have been a major political talking point in 
recent years, it is unclear whether anyone is willing to spend political 
capital on legislative action aimed at fixing the statutory language of 
the BPCIA. Thus far, it seems that balancing interests of innovators and 
consumers remains within legislative rather than judicial expertise. 
While maxims of statutory construction are a vital tool of 
interpretation, it appears that their use has thwarted the original purpose 
of the text to which they apply, ultimately to the nation’s detriment. 
This is a lesson legislator need to remember as they continue working 
towards solutions that benefit all the stakeholders in the 
pharmaceuticals industry.  
